Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

Gordon L. Weight v. Harry B. Miller : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Layne B. Forbes; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Merrill K. Davis; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Weight v. Miller, No. 10037 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4463

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
of the State

1 'V~ £

O

JUN 11 i.96A

G.OB.DON L. WEIGHT,
--·-····· --·····--···t;~~;t:-iit~h"-··-· ----····- k
preme
Pl,Mn,tiff tmd BespondeKt~r ·
Case No.
-vs...
10037
B.ABBY B. MILLER, and HARRY B.
~~

dba LORRAINE PRES·S,

Defendant and APfJellm~t.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Merrill ·C. Faux, Judge
,,

anTE B. FORBES
Pioneer Savings Building
hmtifui, Utah

..tctonacw fer Plait&tifl awd Responde.t
MERRILL K. DAVIS

53 East Fourth South Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Atton&BtJ for DeferuiD.nt and Appellm\t

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

NATURE OF CA,SE -------·················--···--------------··-------------····-----------1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ------------------------------····-----------1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------····-----------1
ST ATEl\IENT OF FACTS ····-···········--·--·············----··--·-··--··-···---------2
ARGUMENT ··-·····················--··--··-···············-···-··-········--·····----·-----------3
POINT I: THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
HOLDING THAT THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WAS MUTUALLY TERMINAED AND
THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE IN THE
AMOUNT OF $1200 WAS EXE,CUTED SUBSEQUENT TO SUCH TERMINATION AND
THEREFORE HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO
THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT. -----------------· .......... 3
POINT II: THE LOWER COURT DID NOT GO
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE PRE-TRIAL
ORDER IN DETERMINING "THAT THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WAS MUTUALLY
TERMINATED AND THAT THE PROMISSORY
NOTE WAS NOT QUALIFIED BY T'HE TERMS
OF THE AGREEMENT. ------------------·--·-··--------------···--------

8

CON·CLUSION ---·--··········-------------------------------------------------------··-------

9

CASES CITED
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P 2d 176, (1961)......... 4
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P 2d 86 ( 1963) ............. 4
Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 224 P 2d
640 ·----------------------------------------··········----------·-·········-------------·-----------4
Page v. Fed. Security Ins. ·Co., 8 Utah 2d 226, 332
P2d 666 ( 1958) -------------------------------------------------------------·-----------4
Copper King Mining Co. v. Hanson, 2 Utah 605
176 p 623 ----------------------------------------------------------: __________________________ 7
McBride v. Stewart, 68 Utah 12, 249 P 114 -------------------------·
8
Lowman v. Kuecker, 246 Iowa 1227, 71 NW2d 586,
----------52 ALR 2d 1380 --------------------------------------------·--------------·-------------9
TEXTS
5 Am. Jur., Appeal & Error, § 562, 717 .......................................... .?
12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 432, 433, 440 -------···--·······----------------------9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GORDON L. WEIGH·T,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

- vs.H:\HHY B. MILLER, and HARRY B .

Case No.
10037

.MiLLER, dba LORRAINE PRESS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff Gordon L. Weight to
re(·ovpr on a promissory note in the amount of $1,200.00
and executed in his favor by Defendant Harry B. Miller
on the 2nd day of January, 1960.
DISPOSITIOX IN THE LOvVER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
rtah, with Judge Merrill C. Faux presiding, awarded
judg11wnt to Plaintiff in the amount of $1,200.00, $92.00
interPst, attorney's fees in the amount of $348.33 and
$15.00 costs.
RELIEF SOFGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Harry B. :Miller seeks reversal of the
derision of the lower court. Plaintiff Gordon L. \V eight
:'l'Pks affirn1ance of the lower court's decision.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent shall hereinafter be referred to as Plaintiff and Appellant shall hereinafter be referred to as
Defendant.
Plaintiff accepts Defendant's Statement of Facts
except in certain particulars noted as follows. Plaintiff
does not concede that Plaintiff initiated the conversation
with respect to entering into an employment agreement.
Plaintiff denies that Defendant was specifically relying
upon the payment by Plaintiff of the balance of $3~800.00
in order to purchase ~ certain printing press. Plaintiff
does not agree that Defendant often reminded him that
the balance of $3,800.00 was due but states affirn1atively
that the Plaintiff did not specify any particular time
within which the balance should be paid. (R,..ll) Plaintiff asserts that he did not state to the bookkeeper Ruth
Marks on the 18th of January, 1960, that he was employed
elsewhere at the time. (R-40) Plaintiff further asserts
that he did not break appointments with customers
and did not evidence a loss of interest in his work.
Plaintiff further denies that Defendant ever offered
to pay him stock of the corporation as pay1nent of the
promissory note. (R-21)
On the 1st day of October, 1959, Plaintiff and
Defendant entered into an Employn1ent Agreement. The
terms are essentially as set forth in Defendant's Statement of Facts. Preriously the Plaintiff had paid to the
Defendant $1,200.00 The Agreement contemplated a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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promiHsory notP representing the invPstment made by
1)lnintiff. One such note was initially prepared for
signatun· but was not signed by the Defendant. (R-10,
29, 30) During Decentber, 1959, the Defendant beriame
dissastisfied with Plaintiff's perfonnance, (R-28), reminded him of such, discussed the matter with Mr.
~lontgomery, Plaintiff's attorney at the time (R-98),
and as a result of such dissatisfaction stated to Plaintiff
that he would discontinue paying him a salary and
instead pay him a 10% commission of sales. R-28)
.:\H a result of such condition imposed Plaintiff became
dissatisfied with the working relationship and the employment arrangement was mutually terminated.
As a cumulation of such termination the Defendant
executed a promissory note on January 2, 1960, representing the initial amount invested by Plaintiff.. (R-3,
39, 73, and P-1). Since the rnoney was invested in Septt•mber, 1959, the note was dated as of Septe~nber, 1959,
in order to entitle Plaintiff to interest from that date.
(R-73).

ARGUMENT
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMING DE·CISION OF
LOWER COURT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WAS
:\IUTUALLY TERMINATED AND THAT . THE
PROMISSORY NOTE IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,200.00
WAS EXECUTED SUBSEQUENT TO SUCH TERM!-
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NATION AND THEREFORE HAD NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.

In considerin~ the soundness of the trial courts'
findings and judgment this .court may indulge in the
presumption that the judgment was valid and was based
upon competent evidence. The evidence and all infer·
ences that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom
tnust be viewed in light most favorable to it. The burden
here is upon the Defendant in affirmatively showing that
the trial court was in error. The following authorities
are cited in support of the foregoing propositions:
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U 2d 389, 360 P2d 176 (1961);
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U2d 205, 381 P2d 86 (1963).
'The trier of fact can best judge the credibility of the
witness and the weight to be given the evidence for he
can observe firsthand their demeanor, forthrightness
and candor. Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 U
612, 244 P2d 640; Page v. Federal Security Insurance
Co., 8 U2d 226, 332 P2d 666 ( 1958).
The evidence substantiates the court's findings that
the parties had tern1inated the employment relationship
and that the note in question was executed after such
termination and, therefore, had no relationship with the
employment agreement. In support of such contention
Plaintiff submits the following points:
(1) The Defendant was dissatisfied with the per·
formance of the Plaintiff and especially so in December,
1959. (R-72, 76). He felt so keen about the matter that
the D·efendant left Plaintiff notes or memos reminding
him about the fact that he was not earning as much as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he was being paid. (R-27).
'(2) The Defendant contacted Mr. }.fontgomery,

Plaintiff's attorney at the time, and discussed the matter
with him. On that occasion the Defendant stated that
he was .. afraid he was going to have to let him go." It
is t-'ignificant that the Defendant felt so keenly about the
mattPr that he felt prompted to discuss the matter with
Mr. Montgomery. (R-98).

(3) Between January 2, 1960, and January 18, 1960,
the Defendant had no contact with the Plaintiff and did
not eall him in order to inquire as to the reason for the
Plaintiff not working. Such action on Defendant's part
was certainly consistant with the position that the
Defendant considered the employment relationship
terminated (R-85, 86).
( 4) In Decetnber, 1959, the Defendant imposed as a
condition of future employment that the Plaintiff should
be paid on a 10% commission basis instead of a regular
salary. Such condition was at variance with the terms
of the Employment Agreement. The commission basis
was to be retroactive to December 15th. The Defendant
refused to pay the Plaintiff for the last two weeks in
December. (R-27, 28).

( 5) The Plaintiff too was dissatisfied with the employment relationship. Defendant had not allowed him
to participate in management and it was not his understanding that he should remain pennanently as a salesman. (R-:27, 28).
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( 6) On January 2, 1960, the Defendant at Plaintiff's
request, executed the promissory note on a blank printed
form secured from an office supply company. (R-39,
73, P-1. The note was initially dated January 2, 1960,
but this date was crossed out and the date September
1, 1959, was inserted. This was for the sole reason of
entitling the Plaintiff to interest from the date of his
initial investment. (R-73). It is significant that the note
made no mention of the Employment Agreement or that
the proceeds should be paid in stock. (P-1). The note
was made after the termination of the Ernployment
Agreement and is unequivocal with respect to the mode
of payment.
(7) The Plaintiff and Defendant conversed about
the repayment of note at a tirne subsequent to its execution. This conversation took place outside of the
State Purchasing Office of the State Capitol. On that
occasion the Defendant evidenced some concern about the
Plaintiff trying to "peddle the note" and thereupon
indicated that he would pay off the note. (R-21, 22).
No mention was made, however, about paying the note
off in stock.
(8) While it is true, as Defendant asserts, that the
initial investment was made in contemplation of subsequently receiving stock in the Lorraine Press after it
it was incorporated, it was also true that these matters
never did materialize during the course of Plaintiff's
employment. It is also true that a note was prepared
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for

D~fPndant's

signature. (R-10, 29, 39). This note
wa~ never signed. The note that eventually was executed
was PXP<'nh•d after the agreement was tenninated and
was not the note contemplated in the agreement. It was
not for the sa1ne amount and made no reference to the
('ontract or agreement and made no reference to the
fact that the payment should be n1ade in stock.
From the foregoing evidence the court could have
justifiably held that the employment agreement was
tPrminated in a number of ways. Written contracts may
be rescinded by oral agreements. 12 Am. J ur., Contracts
~ 432; Restatement, Contracts. Vol. 2 § 407. They may
also be rescinded or terminated by implication as a
result of the acts of the parties. An example of such
is where the contracting parties subsequently make a
new contract ineonsistent with the term sof the former
agrePment, as Plaintiff and Defendant did in the present
ca-:~. 12 Am. J ur., Contracts, ~433; Restatement, Contraets, Vol. 2, ~508; Copper King !-fining Co, v. Hanson, 52 lTtah, 605, 176 P. 623. On January 2, 1960,
some three months after the execution of the mnployn1ent
agreement, the Defendant executed the note in question.
And a.s has been repeatedly stated this note made no
mention of the employment agreement or that the pre<'~eds should be paid in stock. Therefore, such note was
inconsistent with the terms of the former agreement.
The lower eourt could also have based its decision
on the fact that the contract was rescinded or termin-
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ated because of a n1aterial breach by the Defendant. It
12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § -±-±0; Hestateinent, Contracts,
is well settled that a 1naterial breach warrants n't-;cission.
Vol. 2, § 397; ~,LcBride v. Stewart, 68 Utah 12; 2-±9 Pac.
114. Certainly the Defendant's apparent r<>fusal to sign
the initial promissory note prepared or his refusal
to pay the Plaintiff a wage would constitute material
breaches.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT GO BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER IN DETERMINING THAT THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
WAS MUTUALLY TERMINATED AND THAT THE
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS NOT QUALIFIED BY
THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

The Pre-Trial Order states as follows: "The only
question for the trial court to determine will be whether
or not the note in question is any part of the contract
attached to the answer." The inquiry and testimony
during the trial related to whether or not the note in
question was a part of the e1nployment agreement. Much
of the testimony dealt with whether the Plaintiff nnd
Defendant terminated their en1ploy1nent relationship.
This testimony was certainly material to the basic
question involved, for if the employment relationship
was terminated as the court found then the promissory
signed note into evidence.
Plaintiff's cross examination exceeded the scope of
Defendant's direct examination. That one exception
was with respect to the admission of the original un-
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well settled that a party nmy not complain to the
npp<•al court about the ilnproper adinission of evidence
whieh lw himself has introduced of elicited. 5 Am. Jur.,
.\p1wal und ~ITor, § C>(i~, 717. Lowman v. Kuecker, 246
lowa 1~~i, il N\Y2d 586, 52 ALR 2d 1380.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully contends that the trial court
did not err in holding that the pron1issory note in question was a separate and distinct obligation from the
employ1nent agreement. Even though the note related
to the initial $1,200.00 investment by Plaintiff it was
PXPeuted after Plaintiff and Defendant mutually terminated their relationship. The note made no mention
of the employment agreement or that it was to be paid
in stock. The court did not go beyond the scope of the
pre-trial order; the evidence from which the court based
it~ findings was supplied by Defendant's witnesses and
wa~ submited without objection from Defendant that
t1w testimony was beyond the scope of the pre-trial order.
The pre-trial order limited the issues to an inquiry as
to whether or not the note in question was related to
tlw employment agreement. Implicit within such inquiry
was the determination whether or not the employment
note which was subsequently executed was not part of the
contract as Defendant contends.
The lower court did not alter the terms of the
employment agreement by requiring that re-payment
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of Plaintiff's investment be made in ''money" instead of
"stock" as Defendant alleges. The court held, and
justifiably so, that the employ1nent contract was terminated at the tin1e the note was executed. Therefore, it
had no relationship with the agreement. As such the
note existed as a separate obligation according to the
terms therein which provided for the payment in money.
The Defendant's point that the trial court went
beyond the scope of the pre-trial order is not well taken.
All of the evidentiary matters considered were necessary
and incidental to the basic question established by the
pre-trial order. Even assuming that the court exceeded
the scope of the pre-trial order. Defendant's position
is without merit. The doctrine of "vVaiver" and "Invited Error" have application here. It is significant
that with the exception a few basic inquiries submitted
to Plaintiff by his counsel on direct examination, (R-2, 3)
all of the testimony elicited was from defendant's witnesses. The Defendant even made the Plaintiff his
witness. The testimony upon which the trial court based
its decision was elicited from Defendant's witnesses. It
is noteworthy that with one exception the Defendant
did not object to the admission of the testimony of the
various witnesses nor did he object that the scope of
agreement was operative at the time the note was executed. The court held that it was not, and rightly so.
Respectfully submitted,

LAYNE B. FORBES
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent
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